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Abstract: David Macri recently 
defended his PhD thesis “Hong 
Kong in the Sino-Japanese War: The 
Logistics of Collective Security in 
South China, 1935-1941” at the 
University of Hong Kong. The thesis 
raises new and important questions 
about the strategic background to 
the events of late 1941. Dr. Macri 
is also interested in operational and 
tactical issues and this report from 
the US National Archives is of special 
interest to Canadians. The author, 
Major Reynolds Condon, was an 
American assistant military attaché 
in Hong Kong who witnessed the 
battle before being released back to 
the US. His report, while not always 
factually correct, helps shed some 
light on aspects of the battle for which 
he was an eyewitness.
During the battle of Hong Kong several  US Army off icers 
participated in events and were 
subsequently held by the Japanese 
army after the surrender of the colony 
on 25 December 1941. One of these 
was Major Reynolds Condon, an 
artillery officer who was serving as 
an assistant military attaché. Major 
Condon was released along with 
other diplomatic personnel in mid 
1942 and he presumably returned to 
the United States via Brazil aboard 
the Swedish registered SS Gripsholm, 
but details on his journey remain 
uncertain.1 On 11 August 1942, 
Major Condon submitted a report 
to US Army Military Intelligence 
on the British defence of Hong 
Kong. His scathing criticism 
is often incorrect in the details 
and is strongly influenced by 
personal bias. He also fails 
to recognize that Far Eastern 
defences were inadequate 
in part because of previous 
A m e r i c a n  i n d i f f e r e n c e , 
and his comments on the 
higher direction of Allied 
strategy in southern China 
are not completely accurate. 
Nevertheless, his report, 
especially the latter half, 
helps shed some light on 
aspects of the battle for which 
he was an eyewitness, and 
when Condon focuses on 
matters of which he had 
direct personal involvement 
he  prov ides  addi t iona l 
useful information on some 
significant actions and personalities. 
Given the circumstances of Hong 
Kong’s isolation as well as the overall 
combat effectiveness of Allied forces 
in general at that time, his account 
can be considered unbalanced. His 
views are sometimes emblematic of 
the contemptuous attitudes often 
exhibited towards Chinese and 
British officers by Americans who 
later served under General Joseph 
Stilwell in the China-Burma-India 
command. Whether views such as 
those expressed were formed because 
of defeats at places like Hong Kong 
or were already established amongst 
American military officers is difficult 
to assess fully, but it is useful to 
remember that untried United States 
Army forces also performed 
poorly during their initiation 
to combat in a variety of 
different theatres. Condon’s 
report is still significant, 
however, as it gives a third 
party account of the battle that 
has hitherto gone unnoticed. It 
is reproduced below.
The Fall of Hong Kong
The Condon Report
edited by David Macri
Colonel Reynolds Condon (right) 
was an American assistant 
military attaché in Hong Kong 
when the colony was attacked 
by Japan in December 1941. 
Condon was released with 
other diplomatic personnel in 
mid-1942 and subsequently 
wrote a scathing report on the 
British defence of the colony. 
He is pictured here talking to 
Major-General Frank Merrill in 
China in 1944.
© Canadian Military History, Volume 20, Number 2, Spring 2011, pp.65-80. 1
Macri: Condon Report
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
66
Summary
 Hongkong  was  a t t acked  on 
December 8, 1941 by an estimated 2 
Japanese divisions, 48 pieces of artillery, 
20 planes. It capitulated December 25, 
1941. Due to a combination of defeatism, 
lethargy, complacency, and stupidity, no 
resistance worthy of the name was offered 
by the British.
 The undersigned was serving in the 
Hongkong office of the Military Attaché 
to China at the time of the Japanese 
attack on the Colony, December 8, 
1941. With me at the time were Major 
R.A. Grussendorf, Military Attache for 
Air, and Captain William M. Clarkson, 
Adjutant of the American Military Mission 
to China, both in Hongkong for medical 
treatment. During the fighting we visited 
and served with as many organizations 
as time, physical condition and other 
duties permitted. These officers are each 
submitting an individual report, Major 
Grussendorf’s including the subject of air 
operations. Their verbal statements to me 
were of great value in forming a picture 
fitting in with that which I observed myself. 
 Major Stuart Wood, F.A., stationed 
in Hongkong, was invaluable in obtaining 
information on the defense plans. He was 
in Manila undergoing surgical treatment 
when the attack came so was not present 
during the battle. 
 Since it was quite impossible to 
save any notes, certain statements made 
are undoubtedly incorrect in detail; as a 
picture they are accurate. 
 Many stories were heard of good and 
intelligent fighting in unvisited sectors. 
While the reports may have been correct, 
it is believed the outcome of these 
engagements justifies the conclusion that 
the fighting was everywhere about the 
same as that observed. 
 Practically everything stated about 
the British is derogatory in the extreme. 
This is regrettable, but it is what we 
observed. It is firmly believed that had 
the teachings of our service schools been 
energetically put into practice Hongkong 
would have been held indefinitely against 
the comparatively light attack delivered. 
 If it appears that the undersigned 
exceeded his authority in meddling in the 
affairs of the British Army, it can only be 
said that as the senior American officer 
present I felt it my duty to use every effort 
to keep them fighting as long as possible. 
 In my opinion, the chief reason for 
the rapid fall of Hongkong was lack of the 
aggressive spirit, bred from a knowledge 
by all ranks that the Colony could not be 
held. From this basic attitude of mind it 
was an easy step into slipshod training, 
careless and faulty planning, which in turn 
led to disaster.
1. Plan
 The staff officers with whom from 
time to time Major Wood and I discussed 
the defense plan stated that they were 
authorized to reveal any information we 
asked for. In practice, a question was 
replied to in such a roundabout fashion 
that frequently it was not answered at 
all. One thing was definite: the mainland 
would be held for three months, the island 
an additional three. 
 The means were as reported to the 
Military Intelligence Division shortly prior 
to the outbreak of war and were, according 
to a faulty memory, about as follows: Navy, 
seven motor torpedo boats (other ships 
were to leave when hostilities started), 
several hundred dockyard workers: Air 
Force, four obsolete unarmed ships, no 
airfield suitable for fast pursuits: Army, 
six battalions of infantry (two Canadian, 
two Indian, one Scotch, one English), 
artillery sufficient to man nine 9.2” guns, 
eight 6” howitzers, eleven 4.5” mountain 
howitzers, eight 18 pounders, six or 
eight 4.5” AA guns and a few AA guns of 
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lesser calibre, one battalion of engineers, 
detachments of signals, ordnance etc., 
- a total of some 9,000 regulars. The 
Hongkong volunteer force, about 3,000, 
largely composed of Europeans, trained 
as infantry or artillery for about two years. 
Foodstuffs were ample. Pointed questions 
about ammunition were answered by, “I 
think we have plenty, you know,” or “A 
goodish bit I believe.” 
 The method to be employed was 
passive, consisting of a rapid withdrawal 
to the line of hills stretching across the 
Kowloon peninsula. When forced to 
evacuate, withdrawal would be made to 
the island. The Kowloon line consisted 
of concrete pillboxes. A few days before 
the war I still saw no barbed wire, except 
on the beaches, and no entrenchments. 
The infantry consisted of three battalions 
(Scots on the left, two Indian battalions 
in the center and right) supported by 4.5” 
howitzers manned by the Hongkong-
Singapore artillery (Chinese and Indian, 
officered mostly by whites). 
 The island of Hongkong likewise was 
defended by pillboxes near the shoreline. 
The shoreline was wired, but wire nowhere 
was in sufficient abundance. There 
were no entrenchments. Pillboxes were 
equipped with two to six machineguns, 
many of them light Brens. There was 
a considerable number of small but 
excellent searchlights. About ten antitank 
guns and the eight 18-pounder field 
pieces were in position on the shore. The 
Middlesex battalion manned the pillboxes 
from the north to the southeast and the 
few on Aberdeen Island. They were 
supported by one Canadian battalion. 
The other Canadian battalion had the 
southeast sector. From east to north 
the shoreline was lightly held by the 
Volunteers; this sector was to be taken 
over by the Indians on withdrawal.
 Defense against  a i rcraf t  was 
necessarily largely passive. Antiaircraft 
guns were all located on Hongkong, 
sited to protect the triangle: Navy yards 
at Hongkong and Aberdeen, West Point. 
Tunnels had been dug for an estimated 
one-sixth of the population. Dispersal 
areas in the hills (stocked with foodstuffs 
and materials to construct light shelters) 
had been designated but not reported to 
the people. Air raid practices had been 
held frequently, wardens of various kinds 
seemed to be well instructed and to know 
their duties. Practice blackouts were 
good.
Comments
 At the time of taking up my duties 
in Hongkong about October 1, 1941, I 
was amazed at the carefree attitude of 
the officers of the garrison. A gradually 
increasing knowledge of the state of the 
defense filled me with consternation which 
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was shared by Major Stuart Wood, F.A., 
and Captain Hudson, USN, Commanding 
the South China Patrol. Captain Hudson, 
for the Navy, Major Wood and myself, for 
the Army, tried our best to point out to 
the Commanding General by means of 
conversations with his staff officers what 
we could not consider basic errors. For 
the Army, these were:
 A. The defense was not organized 
in depth. Behind the line of pillboxes 
there were no fortifications other than a 
few concrete OP’s, practically unarmed. 
We considered this the most grievous 
error, especially aggravated since the 
lines were not made continuous by 
trenches. The British stated they did not 
have sufficient men to man the fixed 
defenses and still have proper supports 
and reserves; they did not agree with our 
contention that the fewer the troops the 
more mobile should be the defense.
 B. The disposition of the Middlesex, 
with its Canadian support, was extremely 
faulty. Each battalion should have 
been assigned its sector. This met with 
agreement, though nothing was done. 
 C. The 18-pounders should not have 
been in position. The guns were World 
War field pieces, the best weapon against 
landing craft the British had. Positions 
taken could not cover the entire shoreline. 
We believed these guns should have 
been held in readiness. With suitably 
selected positions, two guns could have 
been in action in any part of the island in 
a maximum of five minutes, and the eight 
pieces in about thirty. Guns remained 
where they were, largely in the west and 
south.
 D. When the garrison was reinforced 
with Canadians, vital time was wasted in 
sending troops to their battle stations. The 
Canadians arrived on November 16th and 
were disembarked in Kowloon. Their one 
period of five days in the field was spent 
in Kowloon. The Scots and one battalion 
of the Indians remained at their old posts 
on the island. The reason for the delay in 
taking up their proper positions was given 
as lack of barrack space, though how 
that entered was not clear. The British 
apparently did not consider a thorough 
knowledge of the ground to be of much 
importance. 
 (Note: The move was started 
December 5th and was not completed 
until the night of December 7-8th)
 E. The plan for immediate withdrawal 
to the Kowloon line gave up an excellent 
chance to harass the advancing enemy, 
slow down his advance, and cause 
casualties with little loss to us. It also gave 
up the chance of making contact with local 
Chinese guerrilla units.
 F. The one airfield was inadequate 
but could have been promptly enlarged 
sufficiently to take care of fifty pursuit 
ships by razing a few blocks of dwelling 
houses. This the British thought was too 
costly. As the event turned out, it probably 
made no difference due to shortage of 
planes. 
 G. Not enough use was made of 
Chinese manpower. Our contention 
was that Chinese could be trained in a 
short time to man pillboxes and artillery 
pieces and to act as labor troops, thus 
releasing a number of trained good troops 
for reserves. After much discussion the 
British did commence the organization 
of a Chinese machine gun battalion. 
Enlistments were opened about the 
middle of November for the first cadre of 
fifty men. There were over 600 volunteers 
the first day.
 H. There was no proper liaison 
with the Chinese Kwangtung forces 
and no proper scheme for operating 
in the Japanese rear. The only plans 
were to send a liaison officer to Chinese 
headquarters and from one to three 
commandos from Burma, after the 
war should have started. We wanted 
the British to send a large liaison unit, 
equipped with radio, as soon as possible. 
We wanted officers from Hongkong to 
travel in unoccupied Kwangtung, make 
contact with local commanders, and 
so be available and equipped to serve 
as advisers in operations against the 
Japanese rear. We especially wanted a 
plan of concerted Sino-British action, even 
hoping the Chinese could be induced to 
make a surprise attack on the airfield 
at Canton. The military representative 
in Hongkong of Generalissimo Chiang 
was anxious to obtain British aid and to 
cooperate along the above lines. These 
ideas were still under advisement on 
December 8th. 
 I. While the foreign population was 
well instructed about air raids (almost all 
of them had specific duties in the ARP), 
the Chinese population was largely 
uninstructed. Assignments were not 
made to the inadequate dugouts. Those 
who could not be accommodated were 
not assigned dispersal areas or routes to 
reach them. We suggested that at least 
one person from each house be actually 
taken to the proper dispersal area; that 
definite assignments to shelters be 
made. The reply was that it would disrupt 
business for a day and that the Chinese 
when frightened always run for the hills 
anyway. 
2. Outbreak of Hostilities
 About 5:30 a.m., December 8th, 
there was a clash with Japanese patrols 
at the Kowloon border. A raid of nine 
dive bombers on the Kai-tek airfield at 
7:55 a.m. destroyed one clipper at her 
moorings, six CNAC ships and the four 
army planes on the ground. 
3. December 8 – 10
 These days were largely dominated 
by confusion. Fighting was in progress in 
Kowloon, the withdrawal going according 
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to plan. Planned demolitions were 
reported being carried out 100%. The 
end of the period saw the Kowloon line 
manned, everything presumably in order. 
 Air raids were light but frequent. At 
first everyone who could took cover in the 
dugouts and stone buildings; in a day or 
so most people went about their business 
unless ordered into cover by an air raid 
warden; within a short time it was realized 
that the sirens were doing more damage 
than the enemy and they were seldom 
sounded thereafter.
 Few if any of the Chinese went to 
the dispersal areas, leaving those of us 
who had seen the slaughter of civilians 
at Chungking and Chengtu uneasy at 
the thought of what havoc just a few 
bombers might at any moment create in 
the overcrowded tenements of West Point 
or Wanchai.
 The stores were thronged with 
officers. Some were hurriedly buying 
uniforms as they did not have the proper 
kit. Some were buying provisions, 
toilet articles, etc., for their families as 
uniformed personnel took precedence 
in being served. Everybody was busy in 
buying essentials.
 Visits were made to the Intelligence 
Section in its old offices in the Naval 
Dockyard. Information was meagre in 
the extreme. They didn’t know what units 
were attacking or how many, and did not 
seem to care. When the sirens went we 
all trooped out of the wooden building and 
stood about the yard gossiping until the all 
clear sounded. There was no unseemly 
haste in moving the office to its battle 
station in the colossal air-conditioned 
headquarters dugout known as the Battle 
Box. Visits to the front were delayed owing 
to difficulties in obtaining the requisite 
passes.
4. December 11 – 13
 On December 11th it was announced 
that Kowloon could no longer be held 
and would be evacuated that day. 
Unfortunately the order included the 
police force, leaving the inhabitants at 
the mercy of Chinese looters. So many 
stories were heard of the ensuing reign 
of terror that there must have been 
considerable pillage.
 About this t ime the Japanese 
emplaced a battery of 360 mm howitzers 
within range of Hongkong and fired 
counterbattery and interdiction fires. 
 On December 12th it was revealed 
that one battalion of Indians, with a few 
4.5” howitzers, were still on the mainland 
at Devil’s Peak. They were evacuated that 
night across the eastern channel without 
loss. 
 The general opinion of the military 
at this time seemed to be that the 
situation was not too bad. The collapse 
of resistance in Kowloon was attributed to 
the fall of the one pillbox; considered to be 
an unlucky break with no particular blame 
attached to anyone. The withdrawal had 
been beautifully carried out with almost 
no loss. 
 By time the physical strain on military 
personnel was becoming increasingly 
evident. From the outbreak of hostilities 
key personnel had remained at their 
posts day and night taking almost no 
sleep, keeping awake on whiskey and 
tea. At Headquarters gossip seemed to 
be the order of the day, punctuated by 
interminable telephone conversations in 
which the personal element outweighed 
the official by three to one.
 The police force was mobilized into 
the army but was, I believe, never used 
in the fighting.
 Confusion in the city lessened 
somewhat as the various administrations 
and boards became slightly more efficient.
 Air raids continued without causing 
much damage or excitement amongst 
the populace. The enemy brought up 
more long range guns but did not heavily 
bombard the city. 
5. December 14 – 19
 These days were marked by inaction 
on our part while the enemy brought up 
A squadron of Kawasaki Ki-32 “Mary” 
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means for a final assault. The Japanese 
brought up more artillery, to an estimated 
48 pieces of 6” or greater calibre. However, 
they contended themselves with a 
minimum of shelling, still counterbattery 
and road interdiction. Counterbattery on 
our part was greatly hampered due to 
lack of sound ranging equipment. Flash 
ranging telescopes were eventually set 
up but were of little use as enemy guns 
were well behind the crest and there was 
no inter-communication between flash 
stations. The British seemed perfectly 
satisfied with sending over 10 or 20 
rounds of 6” shells in the general direction 
of a battery firing; when the battery 
ceased firing it was announced as 
“silenced.” As far as I know we fired not 
a round of interdiction fire.
 The Japanese set up trench mortars 
on the Kowloon waterfront from which 
positions we could plainly see them 
working their mortars, shelling downtown 
Hongkong. The mortar bomb had a thin 
shell case, a super-quick fuse. Due to the 
very fine fragmentation, little damage was 
caused except to morale. I was informed 
that we could not fire on these targets with 
18-pounders because we had no time 
shell or shrapnel, the short range making 
percussion shell nearly valueless on the 
hard-surfaced waterfront. I was informed 
that the 4.5” howitzers could not reach 
the target (this information was certainly 
false). To the best of my observation not 
even long range machine gun fire was 
turned on the at first exposed Japanese. 
 On the night of December 18-19 the 
Japanese effected a landing on North 
Point. How this happened I do not know, 
but from conversations with numerous 
people construct it as follows: A single 
motor driven fishing boat containing an 
officer and twenty men simply chugged up 
to the shore and disembarked unopposed. 
They proceeded inland rapidly, the first 
body to report them being a police patrol. 
A ferry service was immediately instituted, 
operated all night and the next day. Fire 
was not brought to bear on these boats 
though they were harried in one or two 
attacks by motor torpedo boats. By noon 
of the 19th a force of possible 2,000 
men, equipped to include trench mortars, 
had been landed. They had advanced 
to Wongneicheong Gap, successfully 
cutting the main road of communication 
between the northern and southern parts 
of the island, leaving only the western 
coast road (partially dominated by fire) as 
communication between the two halves 
of the garrison.
 A general counterattack was ordered 
for 3:30 p.m., December 19th, but this was 
a dismal failure.
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6. December 20 – 25
 A continuation of the picture of lack 
of resolve and inefficiency, defeatism 
penetrated all ranks. There was no 
desire to go out after the enemy. Physical 
condition of the troops became steadily 
worse while that of the officers improved 
slightly, as they began to see the necessity 
of sleep. 
 The British never properly organized 
any position. Isolated groups took up 
posit ion without mortars, machine 
guns, or artillery support. They did not 
entrench. They had no communication 
with their higher commanders or with 
each other. Supply even of food and 
ammunition was the worry of the smallest 
unit commanders, none ever being sent 
forward automatically. 
 In the city the water supply had failed 
due to bursting of exposed mains. This 
was not as serious as might be imagined 
since the population promptly reopened 
long unused wells as well as making use 
of several running streams. 
 Intermingling of units had reached 
what must surely have been the acme of 
confusion. Commanders everywhere took 
and used whatever men they could, not 
only making no attempt to return them to 
their proper units but actually forbidding 
them to return. 
 About noon December 25th a 
conference down to include battalion 
commanders was called. The decision 
to surrender uncondi t ional ly was 
undoubtedly the only one to make under 
the existing conditions. Surrender was 
made by individual units from about three 
to five o’clock.
7. Casualties
 It is most difficult to arrive at any 
reasonable estimate of casualties. British 
units were so inextricably mixed, and 
their administration so bad, that not even 
headquarters had any idea of the losses. 
Though most observers with whom I 
have talked put the figures much higher, 
it is my guess that casualties in killed 
and wounded did not exceed 3,000 for 
the Japanese and 2,000 for the British. 
Civilian casualties during the fighting 
probably did not exceed 500. 
8. Leadership
 In an attempt to show how faulty was 
the leadership it is believed not amiss to 
discuss in detail some of my dealings 
with certain high ranking officers. Not 
all of the officers with whom I came in 
contact showed up in the same light as 
the following four, but in general all ranks 
displayed the same military ignorance. 
 A. Commanding Officer of the 
Western Group, Royal Artillery.
 I reported to this major for duty 
about 10: p.m. the night of December 
11th at his OP at Wanchai Gap. His 
command consisted of four 6” and four 
4.5” howitzers. I found him literally bent 
double with lumbago. He dosed himself 
liberally with whiskey. At short intervals 
he groaned with pain. He stated he had 
not slept for three days; could not trust his 
orderly to awaken him for telephone calls. 
No fires were scheduled. To my query 
as to why the two enemy supply roads 
were not being interdicted he replied 
that he didn’t know but presumed there 
must be some reason. For the time my 
duties were to merely stay awake and 
call him if the phone rang. I was supplied 
with the folder of orders and instructions 
for the artillery, to improve my time; he 
laboriously climbed into the high bunk 
hung on the wall. All night long, as soon 
as the telephone rang, he climbed down 
to talk, although the majority of calls could 
have been answered by me. He did not 
follow the obvious course of lying down 
on the map table, from which position he 
could talk over the wall telephone without 
much effort. The conversations were 
largely personal, including inquiries as 
to the well-being of the caller and mutual 
friends. Each call lasted several minutes. 
Then he would groan and say, “This 
bloody administration, administration all 
the time!” Not a round was fired by eight 
the next morning. At this time a captain, 
to be his executive, reported and I was 
relieved until dusk. 
 At 4:00 p.m. I found he was in much 
better physical condition. As I entered he 
and his executive were trying to think of 
what corrections to consider in plotting the 
direction of a battery recently fired upon. 
The battery plotted out in the bay. They 
were elated at having fired twenty rounds 
of 6” and silenced the battery.
 A few days later I was acting as 
observer in an OP overlooking Aberdeen. 
Just at dawn three motor torpedo boats 
came in from patrol and tied up beside 
one such boat already at the dock. I 
telephoned this major with somewhat of 
the following conversation:
 “Sir, there are four motor torpedo 
boats tied up beam to beam at Aberdeen.”
 “What’s that old fellow? I say, how 
are you making out? Is your food coming 
out alright? What’s this I hear about your 
sending in three signalmen, that’s their 
post, you know, what?”
 “I have no damned use for the 
signalmen and they had better get to 
work digging pits for your guns there at 
the Gap. How about those boats?”
 “Well, what about them?
 “The Japs will get them.”
 “Well, old fellow, that really is sort of 
a naval show you know. Not our business 
at all really. Hope you got your breakfast 
all right. If there is anything I can do for 
you let me know. Cheerio, old chap.”
 The first plane over at 8:00 a.m. sank 
the four boats with one bomb.
 B. The Chief of Royal Artillery. 
On the morning of December 12th 
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I spent two hours trying to find this 
Brigadier, eventually locating him at 
his living quarters. He was standing 
holding a necktie while his Chinese boy 
was packing trunks and suitcases. He 
apparently did not recognize me so I told 
him who I was, stated that I had been with 
his Western Group Commander the night 
before, and asked to see him on matters I 
considered urgent. He replied courteously 
that he would be glad to have a talk with 
me, but he was very busy. Could I wait for 
him in the Battle Box? After over an hour 
of waiting he still had not appeared. 
 About December 15th I again called 
on this gentleman at his office in the 
Battle Box. We discussed fires; I pointed 
out that Hongkong was falling while 
his guns were cold, suggested that his 
counterbattery was probably completely 
ineffective, requested him to fire instead 
on ships still floating in the harbor, the 
Standard Oil tanks, and interdiction on 
the two supply roads. He replied that he 
had no sound locater apparatus to spot 
the Japanese batteries, and couldn’t we 
supply it to him? I said there was probably 
one chance in a thousand that Manila had 
some out-dated equipment that could be 
flown over. If I radioed to find out about 
that he would cease counterbattery and 
interdict the roads by which the shells 
were being brought up? He agreed. I 
sent a radio to General MacArthur asking 
if it was possible that he had any such 
equipment. I was not later in position to 
observe if the roads were interdicted. 
 On December 19th I called on the 
Brigadier at his position in the Battle 
Box. He did not deny a report I had heard 
that the Japanese were bringing troops 
across the channel in small boats and 
were not being fired upon. I asked why 
18-pounders were not being rushed to 
the scene, to which he replied, “Sir, the 
guns are at their posts!”
 C. The Commanding General. He 
spent almost his entire time in the Battle 
Box. He may have visited the troops but I 
did not hear of it. He did not sleep for the 
first three days and very little thereafter. 
On December 12th he seemed dazed 
from fatigue. He questioned me about 
conditions and seemed anxious to hear 
my views. I felt constrained to report as 
follows:
 (1) His artillery was being very badly 
handled, and recommended that he either 
take over the functions himself or appoint 
a competent chief. He replied that he 
was not an artillerist, that the Brigadier 
seemed sure of his ground, and that he 
had nobody else for the post.
 (2) Of all targets, the Standard Oil 
tanks with their thousands of gallons of 
gasoline stood out as the easiest and 
most promising. He was surprised that 
they had not been demolished. (The tanks 
were never fired upon.) 
 (3) The men, and to a great extent the 
officers, were terrifically impressed with 
the fact that the Japanese had control of 
the air, we had nothing. I pointed out that 
actually the Japanese were making little 
use of this superiority, that bombers were 
causing comparatively small damage, that 
reconnaissance planes were seldom seen 
The remains of the Lye Mun Battery as they appeared in 1945. The narrows of the 
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over the troop positions. I felt he should 
point this out to the command to offset to 
some degree the general loss of morale. 
He was interested, but said the men would 
find it out for themselves. They never did.
 (4) Officers did little to bolster the 
morale of the men. They were largely 
interested in their own affairs, let the men 
look after themselves, did not call men 
to task when they made discouraged 
statements in their presence. He was 
apparently startled, stated he would see 
to a remedy at once. I heard of no action 
taken.
 ( 5 )  O f f i c e r s  a n d  m e n  w e r e 
destroying their own effectiveness due 
to unnecessary loss of sleep. It is believed 
a directive was issued to correct this but 
it was not widely disseminated. 
 D. Lieutenant Colonel of the Winnipeg 
Fusiliers. The colonel commanding this 
battalion had broken under the strain of 
battle and had been hospitalized, leaving 
the lieutenant-colonel in command. 
On the night of December 24-25 he 
permitted a great deal of drinking in 
his CP dugout. He and the major who 
commanded the right of his line indulged 
in a several hours’ long bitter argument 
over the proper method of representing 
troop positions on a map. It was continuing 
when I left at 1:00 a.m. 
The morning of December 25th a staff 
officer of the commanding general 
visited the dugout to give orders for 
a counterattack that afternoon. The 
Lieutenant Colonel replied, “I’ll tell you, 
sir, that I will not again order my troops out 
unprotected against mechanized forces, 
and you can tell that to anyone who 
wants to know!” The staff officer seemed 
embarrassed, took no action as far as 
I know. (Note: The only “mechanized 
forces” employed were the Bren machine 
gun carriers of the British.)
9. Incidents
 In the belief that the detailed reporting 
of certain personally observed happenings 
leads to a better understanding of events 
than can general observations, the 
following incidents are added to those 
reported in the previous paragraph. They 
add little to this report, serving only as 
background. 
 A. On December 11th great difficulty 
was experienced in locating an artillery 
C.P. The C.P. was in a little ravine and 
neither the sentinel on duty at the ravine 
entrance nor any member of the adjacent 
road block guard (which it was necessary 
to pass) knew of its existence. Upon being 
informed of this the officer in command at 
the dugout took no corrective action. 
B. At dawn December 12th it was 
discovered that two artillery supply trucks 
were parked in a level space near a group 
of CP’s. There was great excitement lest 
the trucks expose the position of the 
CP. I was assigned to guide the trucks 
to the artillery supply headquarters. On 
the way we passed twenty loose pack 
mules, partially packed; a short while later 
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pack train proceeding in our direction. 
They had neither officers nor orders. I 
sent men back for the loose animals, 
then took trucks and train to the supply 
station. The British captain in command 
of the station seemed at a loss as to what 
to do with them. 
C. The afternoon of December 13th I saw 
two 4.5” howitzer in position in the center 
of a large level lawn. Guns were spaced 
at twelve yards. Camouflage consisted 
only of nets improperly stretched. There 
was no digging. Ammunition was neatly 
stacked outside the nets. Gun crews 
were resting on the porch of the house. In 
response to questions, the Gun Position 
Officer informed me that he could not 
occupy any of the several natural howitzer 
positions in the immediate vicinity as this 
was the position surveyed. He stated that 
proper fortification would be accomplished 
that night. After the surrender I again saw 
this position. Pits were geometric four 
yards square, one foot deep; removed 
earth had been placed in a parapet two 
feet high on three sides; there were no 
personnel trenches.
 D. The night of December 13th I 
spent at an OP overlooking Hongkong 
harbor. The Lieutenant in charge and I 
had difficulty in locating the concrete OP, 
then found the view of the shoreline was 
blocked by a house in our immediate 
front. We moved to the veranda of the 
house. Wire was extended very slowly 
and routed badly. No map was available 
(except the one I carried) although target 
designation was normally by coordinates. 
This Lieutenant was to have instructed 
me in British artillery methods, but it 
developed that he knew less about them 
than I did.
 E. On December 15th I was instructed 
to be at 9:00 a.m. at a point near an OP 
where a car was to pick me up. The car 
arrived at 12:30 p.m., the British sergeant 
driver stating that he had been unable to 
find the place. 
 F. On December 15th I relieved a 
lieutenant at a concrete OP overlooking 
Aberdeen. The OP was 8’ square, 
so designed that one watcher had to 
alternate between the two ports in order 
to observe the entire sector. There was no 
map. No provision was made for blackout, 
other than laboriously closing the steel 
shutters. Furniture was one cot and one 
small table. Personnel (Indian) was one 
Battery Commander’s Assistant (non-
commissioned officer trained as observer) 
and three signalmen. These men with 
their equipment literally filled the dugout, 
their loud talking never ceased. Since the 
telephone wires were deeply buried there 
was no possible use for the signalmen so 
at dusk I had them report to their adjutant, 
informing him by telephone. He was most 
reluctant to take them. At dawn an Indian 
lieutenant came to relieve me. The orders 
were that the two officers would stand 
alternate reliefs of 24 hours; the BCA 
presumably never being relieved (this was 
actually being carried out in other OP’s). 
The BCA had been on duty for four days. 
I established reliefs to include the BCA of 
24 hours on, 12 hours off. During three 
days only three meals were sent up, but 
the distinction between British and Indian 
rations was not forgotten.
 G. On December 19th at about 2:30 
p.m. the commander of the Winnipeg 
Fusiliers received telephone orders for a 
general counterattack at 3:30 p.m. First 
objective was Wongneicheong Gap, 
thence east about a mile, thence north 
about a mile to a certain hill. Scots would 
be on the left. That was all there was of 
the order. 
 The commander, his adjutant and a 
major then discussed who was available 
for the attack, units being referred to 
by the names of their commanders. 
As a name was thought of that officer 
was summoned to headquarters by 
telephone, sometimes told to bring his 
men, sometimes not. It was agreed that 
eight platoons were available. The major, 
who was present when the orders were 
received, was to lead the attack. No 
supplementary orders were issued. 
 At 3:30 p.m. only two provisional 
platoons, with one Bren gun carrier, were 
assembled. Included in the troops were 
about ten engineers and twenty Scots, a 
few dockyard workers. Each platoon had 
one officer. 
 No arrangements were made for 
communication, supply, artillery or mortar 
support. Each platoon carried one Bren 
gun in addition to the one in the single 
carrier. No medical personnel was 
present. 
 The path or secondary road to 
Wongneicheong Gap was perhaps a mile 
and a half long. After leaving the picket 
in the vicinity of Canadian headquarters 
there was not a single defending soldier 
between there and the Gap. At a gap 
about half way we ran into interdiction 
mortar fire at the rate of shell every fifteen 
seconds. By timing and dispatching his 
men in groups, the major traversed this 
spot with only one man wounded. Shortly 
thereafter one platoon was detached 
and sent over the crest of the mountain 
to attack the Gap. It was later disclosed 
that it had not yet reached the crest when 
darkness fell, at which time it returned 
to the CP.
 The Major, with the other platoon, 
followed the path around the mountain. 
With the Bren gun carrier in the lead, we 
proceeded cautiously around each nose, 
reconnoitring the next stretch of road, 
through which we then ran. Around one 
such nose we could see a road beyond 
Wongneicheong Gap, stretching uphill 
directly away from us. The range was 
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about 600 yards. For a space of some 200 
yards the road was black with Japanese 
infantry resting. The two Brens were put 
in position off the road. My suggestion 
was not to open fire unless the target 
moved, to send back the carrier to report 
the target, ask for artillery fire, and bring 
us more firepower, in the meantime to 
put our riflemen behind the crest so they 
could quickly establish a firing line on 
signal. The decision was to open fire 
immediately with the two machine guns. 
One gunner could not identify the target 
and did not fire. The other fired in bursts of 
five rounds, by the third or fourth of which 
the target had dissolved. There was no 
return fire. 
 We advanced to the next nose which, 
somewhat detached from the mountain, 
formed a ridge about 300 yards long. It 
ran north and south with its crest only 100 
yards west of Wongneicheong Gap. The 
path by which we had arrived ran thirty 
feet below the crest. Both north and south 
the ground fell away steeply from the 
divide. Looking down from the north end 
we could see considerably below us at a 
distance of 200 yards the headquarters 
dugouts of in one of which the Canadian 
Brigadier had been killed the night before. 
At the point where the path rounded the 
southern end of the crest there was a 
shallow artificial cave which contained a 
quantity of abandoned material, including 
machine guns with ammunition, mortars 
without ammunition. There was no 
telephone instrument to connect to the 
line there. A few dead and two wounded 
British soldiers were found. 
 Three hundred yards to the south, but 
out of our reach, was a private house in 
which a British post was still holding out 
with one or more Vickers machine guns. 
Whenever the Japanese tried to cross the 
concrete road through the Gap they got a 
burst of fire in the flank. It was probably 
that one group of brave men that had 
prevented the Japanese from advancing 
all the way to Wanchai Gap in the West 
and Repulse Bay in the south within a day 
after the landing
 Dominating the opposite side of the 
Gap was a stone house, a police station, 
held by the Japanese.
 Darkness was coming on. The 
Major had not heard from his detached 
platoon, his other six to follow, or the 
Scots. His men were tired and hungry, 
many had not eaten that day. After having 
just seen enemy troops outnumbering 
him three or four to one he decided 
to wait for reinforcements. We could 
hear the Japanese entrenching and 
talking on the hillside facing us, but in 
the gathering dusk could see nothing 
of them. A CP was designated on the 
path. While the Lieutenant posted local 
security detachments the Major went on 
reconnaissance from which he failed to 
return. 
 About 9:00 p.m. some 150 Scots 
arrived. They were obsessed with the 
idea of going to the headquarters dugouts 
to the north. I guided them part way and 
returned to the CP. Another platoon of 
Canadians had arrived, with four officers, 
including a major. They decided to storm 
the police station at once. If there were 
any orders given, I didn’t hear them. The 
officers simply walked off, followed by as 
many men as felt the urge, and took the 
station with grenades and rifle fire. The 
Major and two other officers were killed in 
this attack. A strong detachment, with the 
surviving officer, was left at the building, 
the remainder withdrawn to the shelter of 
the ridge. 
 I slept at the CP for several hours. 
When I awakened the Lieutenant of the 
1st platoon was not in evidence, nor had 
he left word of his whereabouts. I went 
out to inspect the pickets. The northern 
one, posted by me in an antiaircraft 
machine gun pit, had disappeared. Their 
machine gun was in the pit, as was also 
a Japanese rifle. The center picket I could 
not locate. The personnel of the southern 
picket was found on the path well behind 
their post. The sergeant left in charge 
stated he thought there was no more 
use for the picket. I ordered him back 
immediately with the three Bren guns 
then available, with orders to support the 
police station by fire when it was attacked. 
Before having an opportunity to post other 
security detachments, I heard a great 
babble of voices from a road below us to 
the south. Going to investigate I met the 
Lieutenant of the 1st Platoon and several 
officers of the Scots. The noise was made 
by the Scots who had gone to the HQ 
dugouts, rested, then marched up the 
concrete road between us and the police 
station and were in a compact mass in 
a hollow below. They claimed they had 
been fired upon from the police station. 
Shouting brought out that it was indeed 
again in Japanese hands. As no one had 
heard the sound of fighting they must 
have been careless and been completely 
surprised. 
 The Scots wanted to attack at 
once, before daylight. They could not 
be persuaded to send a message back 
and let the artillery blow up the house for 
them. They requested that I give them 
one minute of fire from the Brens to cover 
their advance. The Lieutenant of the 1st 
Platoon was sent to collect his men and 
post them to protect our left flank. I went to 
the one picket, found them so lax that two 
Japanese with grenades were discovered 
less than twenty yards from the three 
machine guns. The guns were grouped 
closely together in a position with no field 
of fire. When moving them I found that in 
the group of fourteen men only one was a 
machine gunner, only two others had ever 
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fired a machine gun. Our preparation was 
duly fired but was not very effective, one 
gunner sending every shot over the roof 
of the building.
 The Scots made l i t t le use of 
grenades, though they came within 
grenade distance of the police station. 
The attack was repulsed with, I believe, 
two officers killed, two wounded. Losses 
in men (as in the case of the Canadian 
attack) were comparatively light.
 As dawn broke the Scots decided to 
take over the ridge. I sent all my remaining 
men, 26, into the cave previously 
mentioned. The senior sergeant was 
carefully instructed to hold all the men 
there until my return, to find the Lieutenant 
and instruct him to assemble his men 
at the same place. I got the Bren gun 
carrier and returned to the Canadian CP. 
The carrier was sent to the cookhouse 
for rations and tea while I made my 
report. The CO had not previously had a 
single report of this action. He instructed 
me to bring all Canadians back for a 
rest, did not agree that they could rest 
where they were while remaining in a 
position to support the Scots if needed. 
My request for medical assistance could 
apparently not be complied with, nor could 
I be provided with morphine. Laying a 
telephone wire was for some reason not 
considered feasible.
 At the cookhouse the NCO in charge 
refused to issue rations or make tea until 
I threatened him. 
 On the return to Wongneicheong Gap 
we passed several wounded men making 
their way to the rear. At one point we were 
hailed from the woods by a lieutenant of 
engineers who had a detachment with 
him. He wanted to know if he was needed 
at Wongneicheong Gap, said he had no 
orders. I told him he was badly needed. 
We were sniped at from the mountainside 
above us. When we arrived, one hour 
after having left it, the cave was empty 
except for a badly wounded sailor. No one 
was in sight at the CP or the ridge. I went 
up the ridge, found a number of Scots 
lying down, well scattered. They directed 
me to their lieutenant, also lying down and 
too tired to rise. He could tell me nothing 
of the Canadians. He didn’t want any 
rations or tea; the men had rations and 
were too tired to walk to the tea. He did 
not want any ammunition. He ignored my 
suggestion that at least a guide be posted 
on the road. In the hearing of a number of 
his men he told me things were terrible, 
himself and the men exhausted.
 The wounded sailor had died. The 
road back was deserted, the engineer 
detachment having disappeared, as had 
the walking wounded, some of whom we 
saw dead by the roadside. 
 At the Canadian CP I could not 
convince the commanding officer of the 
desirability of immediately reinforcing and 
holding the ridge and clearing out snipers 
in its rear. The ridge was a strong natural 
position, blocking advance to the west 
while dominating the roads from north 
and south, and seemed to me especially 
advantageous as an artillery forward OP. 
 H. Before dawn December 21st I 
was sent to report to the engineers at 
their headquarters in their private house 
in the vicinity of Wanchai Gap. When 
I reported to the Colonel commanding 
he was supervising the issue of rum, a 
half tumbler per man. He said a platoon 
was being sent out under a lieutenant 
to relieve a detachment on the southern 
crest of Mt. Cameron, and he requested 
me to join them. As again no map but mine 
was available I acted as guide. 
 The ascent of the steep mountain 
was exceedingly laborious; the men could 
not keep up with even the slow strength-
saving pace set by me. It was necessary 
to halt for a rest every fifty yards. 
 Arriving at the position we found it 
deserted. Some abandoned equipment, 
including several rifles, was lying about. 
Prompt visual reconnaissance disclosed 
no Japanese troops in sight. The location 
was excellent for an artillery OP as all 
roads and trails to the west and south 
of Wongneicheong Gap were covered in 
part. The only pair of field glasses was a 
poor one carried by me. We could plainly 
see the house in which was located 
our headquarters, but a suggestion to 
establish a visual signalling station was 
vetoed.
 It was decided to divide the command 
to cover the two routes of possible attack. 
Men were held on the reverse slope with 
a minimum of observers forward. 
 During the day my men were required 
to be separated and to be quiet, with the 
result that they were asleep when not on 
duty and were quite rested at night. The 
Lieutenant did not follow that policy. During 
the morning the peak of the mountain was 
shelled from Kowloon, the overs falling 
close to the Lieutenant’s group. The bulk 
of this was withdrawn to dead space 
near my position, without casualty. The 
Lieutenant was quite worried over making 
contact with Canadians supposed to be 
on our left and took almost his entire unit 
on an expedition to make it. He returned, 
successful, after three hours of difficult 
crawling and climbing to his original 
position. The net result was merely to tire 
further his men since the half mile gap 
remained open. 
 Many of the men had brought beer, a 
few water. It was all consumed by noon. 
No rations were carried. By nightfall the 
Lieutenant expressed, in the hearing of 
some men, his dissatisfaction with the 
situation. He sent a runner with a verbal 
message to request (a) that the platoon 
be relieved as it was exhausted, (b) that 
rations, water and rum be sent up. No 
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/8
77
reply was received; the runner did not 
return. In the hearing of the men he said 
we were all too tired to put up much of 
a fight.
 After dark we moved to the forward 
slopes where we could well cover the 
three important draws. We had no 
entrenching tools so did not improve the 
natural position.
 During the day and night there was 
no enemy activity in our vicinity. What little 
activity we had observed in the distance 
during the daytime was not reported, even 
though the runner had been sent at dusk.
 At dawn my relief was up. I returned 
to the engineer CP with two runners. The 
Colonel was astonished that rations had 
not been sent up but did not seem to 
know whom to blame. The two runners 
were returned heavily laden. I brought up 
the question of an OP, suitable observing 
instruments, a visual station, telephone 
wire, and entrenching. He said he would 
think about it, asked me if I would conduct 
the relief up that afternoon. 
 T h e  r e l i e v i n g  p l a t o o n  w a s 
commanded by a captain. Again we took 
no entrenching tools, signal flags or lights. 
Few grenades were carried; we would 
This photograph was taken during an American B-24 raid on Hong Kong in late 1944. The image is taken looking northward and shows 
the southern part of the Hong Kong mainland and the northern part of the island. A great cloud of smoke can be seen rising from 
the Kowloon docks.  Across from Kowloon is the city of Victoria. In the bottom right corner is the Lye Mun Passage. The mountainous 
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take over the grenades there (the fifty 
were considered to be quite a number) 
as well as the two submachine guns. A 
large jug of rum was carried. We arrived 
at the position just before dark, again 
found it deserted, with more abandoned 
equipment and rifles in evidence. Rum 
was issued, the posts then manned as 
before. At dawn the Captain asserted he 
had no orders to man the position after 
daylight and withdrew the platoon. The 
Colonel displayed no perturbation at thus 
giving up a position which had not even 
been attacked.
 I. About December 23rd the Governor 
visited the Canadian CP at Wanchai 
Gap. He made quite a speech, telling the 
officers of the importance of Hongkong 
and why it must be held to the last ounce 
of fighting power. They were entirely 
unimpressed and upon his departure 
made disparaging remarks.
 J. About 2:00 a.m., December 25th, a 
British Lieutenant of engineers reported to 
the Colonel of the Scots. He was directed 
to put his detachment in position about 
300 yards from the CP, defending a trail 
from the south. When he expressed 
ignorance of the trail (although shown 
him on the map) a sergeant major was 
designated as his guide.
 About 4:00 a.m. I took a patrol of Scots 
down this trail with instructions to proceed 
some two miles and return, driving back 
any enemy patrols encountered. 
 Arriving at the position presumably 
occupied by the engineers I found it 
vacant and sent back a runner to find 
out if the detachment had been ordered 
withdrawn. We proceeded down the path 
a half mile when we heard a body of men 
making their way up a dry watercourse 
below us. The patrol was in a beautiful 
position to drop grenades on them. Just 
in time, we found it was the engineer 
detachment, still with its guide. They had 
been lost, had covered in a roundabout 
route over five miles, and were well tired 
out. I showed the Lieutenant his position.
 K. On the morning of December 25th 
the Japanese made the most intensive 
bombardment of the battle, using planes, 
guns and mortars against the British 
positions. Casualties were not heavy 
but the moral effect was considerable. 
From about 8:00 the Lieutenant-Colonel 
commanding the Canadians started 
receiving telephone calls from the Major 
with whom he had had the alcoholic 
argument the night before. The Major 
was in a key pillbox near Aberdeen and 
was being heavily attacked. He was very 
concerned about his badly wounded 
and insisted that an ambulance be sent 
(obviously impossible) to take them 
out. Some time during the morning he 
capitulated.
 L. About noon December 25th the 
CO of the Scots said he had just received 
orders to go out with all personnel and 
defend the headquarters position to the 
last man. With security detachments on 
the hills above, the ravine could have 
been made hard to take. We abandoned 
it, climbed the steep ravine and took 
refuge in a private house and its yard 
near the crest of a hill. The Canadians 
occupied one slightly below us. The 
Colonel was at this time was called to a 
conference, to which he departed alone. 
 Left in the house were his adjutant 
and a young Canadian officer so drunk 
he could scarcely stand up, and perhaps 
eighty men with Scots predominating. The 
men drank freely until the liquor ran out.
 Dive bombers were dropping large 
phosphorous bombs in the general area, 
setting fire to a few houses and starting 
brush fires. Artillery from Kowloon was 
bombarding house after house near 
us but fortunately did not register on 
the one we were in nor that of the 
Canadians. Many mortar shells fell in 
and around us without causing more than 
minor casualties, perhaps three or four 
men killed or seriously wounded. Men 
commenced to leave singly, in pairs and 
threes, over an exposed path to the west; 
the adjutant made no effort to stop them. 
No attempt was made to fight back. 
 At 3:00 p.m. the Colonel returned, 
ordered the white flag raised. 
 
10. Comments on the British
 While comments have been freely 
indulged in throughout this report it is 
believed the following two points may 
have been insufficiently stressed:
 1. The individual courage shown by 
officers and men was amazing in view of 
their low morale. The officers especially 
went forward to their deaths without 
hesitancy although they had in their 
hearts no hope of success. 
 2. Destruction of valuable property 
was poorly carried out. The enemy 
captured large quantities of oil, arms, and 
munitions. It is probable that even some 
of the 9.2” seacoast guns were taken 
undamaged and still with a considerable 
supply of ammunition. 
11. Comments on the Japanese
 1. Tactics of the Japanese seemed 
suited to the situation. On the occasion 
of landing at North Point, they advanced 
through difficult terrain with startling 
speed. Their quick exploitation of this 
landing was probably the outstanding 
feat of the battle. For the remainder 
of the time their advance was made 
cautiously, consolidating the ground as 
they went. They maintained light pressure 
on the British by means of small patrols, 
infiltrating through the British lines for 
short distances. British positions were 
located, probably by a combination of 
patrols, aerial and terrestrial observation, 
and were then mortared. The prompt 
withdrawal of the British was followed by 
methodical occupation by the Japanese. 
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 2. The moral effect of the Air Corps in 
forcing the decision was great. The actual 
contribution was minor by comparison. 
Chief bombing targets were antiaircraft 
guns and emplaced artillery. I saw 
no bombing or machine gunning of 
troops in the open. The value of their 
aerial reconnaissance is unknown; 
they apparently employed no special 
planes for the purpose but relied on their 
pursuits and dive bombers for reports. 
In conjunction with artillery fire, great 
damage was done gun positions, but 
which factor was the more important is 
problematical. 
 3. Art i l lery f ire was very l ight 
considering the number of guns available. 
This could no doubt be attributed to the 
difficulty of ammunition supply. There 
were stories of very accurate shooting 
but the firing which I personally observed 
was inaccurate, dispersion was great both 
in range and deflection. Interdiction firing 
was usually one round a minute, evenly 
spaced; on at least one occasion the 
rounds were erratically spaced. Key roads 
were not interdicted constantly but were 
rather harassed for perhaps one hour, 
then let alone for several hours. During 
the off periods vehicles could proceed in 
full view of the enemy without drawing fire. 
 4. As indicated above, the infantry 
placed chief reliance on their light mortars. 
Machine guns were little used, rifles were 
used only at point blank range, a condition 
seldom met with. Patrolling was effective, 
especially at night, showing the result of 
long training. Their skill in camouflage 
was remarkable; this was undoubtedly a 
considerable factor in their success. 
 5. Discipline of the troops as observed 
after the capture was good. Their was 
little drunkenness. The usual tendency 
to arrogance towards the conquered 
was observed. Looting by individuals 
is believed to have been on a minor 
scale. Many atrocities were undoubtedly 
committed (I saw one Chinese being 
beaten to death) but there was no general 
rape of the city.
12. Lessons
  The battle was a demonstration in 
blood of the correctness of military thought 
in the United States. Lessons to be drawn 
are believed obvious. Two points had 
such an influence on the outcome of the 
fighting that they are deemed of sufficient 
importance to mention again:
 1. During maneuvers all ranks should 
be trained to take as much sleep as 
the situation allows. There is a natural 
tendency to remain unnecessarily “on the 
job” without rest, leading promptly to great 
reduction of the mental powers and later 
to physical collapse.
 2. Men must be taught to overcome 
their natural fear of airplanes so that they 
may not be overly frightened by the roar 
of a few dive bombers. 
13. Hongkong Under the Japanese
 The first thing immediately apparent 
after the fall of the Colony was the 
unreadiness of the Japanese to govern 
it. There was great confusion caused 
by a reported fight for power between 
the civil, military, and gendarmerie 
authorities. Orders were issued and 
countermanded, regulations made and 
changed or not enforced. Currency 
values, water, electricity, rental rates, 
business permits, and transportation were 
a few of the questions remaining unsolved 
on June 30th. 
 Immediately after the surrender 
shipping filled the harbor, engaged in the 
wholesale looting of the city. Estimates of 
up to one hundred shiploads, largely of 
foodstuffs and metals, were taken out the 
first month. Thereafter looting proceeded 
on a gradually diminishing scale. It was 
still in progress on June 30th. Looting of 
foodstuffs was exceedingly serious to the 
population as the Colony produces almost 
nothing. 
 Urged by the Japanese, perhaps 
half of the Chinese population returned to 
their villages in the provinces. Portuguese 
likewise returned to Macao. Citizens of 
belligerent or unfriendly countries were 
interned. Citizens of truly neutral countries 
received very summary treatment; some 
were imprisoned, their businesses all but 
confiscated outright. 
 No reports were received of any 
extensive fortifications, although there 
were rumors that the airport was being 
enlarged. 
 As of June 30th, the Colony was a 
picture of desolation and despair, with 
food the primary thought of all strata of the 
population. Many deaths have occurred 
from starvation, with many more to come. 
Medicine stocks are very low, with no 
prospects of alleviation. 
 The Chinese may not have loved 
their English masters, but it is a certainty 
that having seen the “New Order” at work 
they would welcome back the old with 
open arms.2 
Editor’s postscript
Condon’s report says a great deal but one of its most important 
aspects is how it expresses the 
prejudices held by some American 
officers against their new allies. 
 Condon had direct personal 
involvement in the course of the 
Battle of Hong Kong and that makes 
his report useful, especially in his 
description of events at the Wong Nei 
Chong Gap and his interaction with 
some of the garrison’s officers, but 
partly because of his own restricted 
field of view as a combatant on 
the ground as well as the colony’s 
relative isolation from outside events, 
comments on matters outside of 
his own personal experience tend 
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to skew the report. His assertion, 
for example, that the Japanese did 
not commit armour to the battle is 
contradicted by Company Sergeant-
Major George MacDonell. While the 
fight for Wong Nei Chong Gap was 
winding down the sergeant-major 
and a platoon of the Royal Rifles 
of Canada destroyed a light AFV 
with Molotov cocktails along the 
eastern side of the island near Red 
Hill. Major-General P. Montague, in 
command of the Canadian Military 
Headquarters in London, also 
reported the presence of Japanese 
light AFVs during the battle.3 More 
significantly,  comments about 
the absence of coordinated Allied 
strategic planning for south China 
are similarly contradicted by officers 
who served with Detachment 204.4 
Coordinated plans were discussed in 
Chungking on 9 December 1941 for 
example, by Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai Shek, British Military Mission 
commander Major-General Lance 
Dennys, and the head of the US 
Military Mission, Brigadier-General 
John Magruder, in Chungking.5 Plans 
were also discussed in Washington 
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific 
War.6 
 Following his release from 
captivity ,  Major  Condon was 
eventually promoted to colonel and 
he went on to serve in Y Force under 
the command of Brigadier-General 
Frank Dorn at Kunming.7
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Dear Sir,
My article on “CH-147D Chinook Nose Art in Afghanistan” was 
published in Canadian Military History 
20, no.1 (Winter 2011) while I was on 
another deployment into Kandahar 
and the Forward Operating Bases to 
collect Op KEEPSAKE material prior 
to the change in the mission from 
that of combat to training the Afghan 
military.  This trip allowed me to 
gather additional information on the 
Chinook nose art.  In his introductory 
notes the editor-in-chief, Roger Sarty 
lamented that the Vargas-style nose 
art has fallen out of vogue.   Roger 
will be pleased to see that “Miss 
Behavin’,” an image in the Vargas 
style, has recently been added to 
the stable of Chinook nose art. (See 
back cover) Although not nearly 
as revealing as the artwork which 
adorned No.6 Group RCAF bombers 
during the war, this newest example 
of Chinook nose art does exemplify 
the pleasant curves of the female form 
which in this case is accented with 
red hair and a low-cut form fitting 
red dress.
 During my recent trip into 
theatre, I not only had a ride on 
“2 for Hooking” but I discovered 
that the Canadian artwork was a 
modification of the artwork which 
was originally on the helicopter 
when it was received from the U.S. 
Army. Unfortunately in May 2011 
“2 For Hooking” was lost in a crash 
in which four persons were injured. 
The nose art from this helicopter may 
eventually be recovered and returned 
to a museum in Canada.
WO Ed Storey
CEFCOM HQ – War Diarist
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